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Group Peer Disagreement
J. Adam Carter
(Forthcoming in Ratio)
A popular view in mainstream social epistemology maintains that, in
the face of a revealed peer disagreement over p, neither party should remain
just as confident vis-a-vis p as she initially was. This ‘conciliatory’ insight
has been defended with regard to individual epistemic peers. However, to
the extent that (non-summativist) groups are candidates for group knowl-
edge and beliefs, we should expect groups (no less than individuals) to be
in the market for disagreements. The aim here will be to carve out and
explore an extension of the conciliatory insight from individual peer dis-
agreement to group peer disagreement; in doing so, I’ll raise and address
three key problems that face any plausible defence of such a constraint.
1 Introduction
Suppose that you believe that p, and–as you just now find out–I believe
not-p; prior to our disagreement, we each reckoned the other to be equally
likely to be right about whether p–viz., we took each other to be epistemic
peers on thematter1. A widespread thought in recent social epistemology is
that: at least in some circumstances like the one just described, a require-
ment of epistemic rationality is that both parties revise their respective
p-beliefs in some fashion2. Call this the conciliatory insight.
Conciliatory insight In a revealed peer disagreement over p, each
individual should give at least some weight to her peer’s atti-
1Epistemic peerhood is typically thought to involve both a cognitive and an evidential
condition; as Lackey puts it, say someone is your epistemic peer, vis-a-vis p (or, more
carefully: vis-a-vis the matter of whether p) just when (roughly) that individual and you
are on a cognitive and evidential par, as your cognitive abilities and evidence bear on the
matter of whether p. See here Lackey (2007; 2009). Cf. Conee (2009).
2For some representative defences of this kind of position, see (e.g. Elga (2007),
Christensen (2007), Feldman (2004; 2007)). Cf. Kelly (2005) and van Inwagen (1996)
for notable opposition.
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tude such that neither is justified in staying exactly as confident
as she initially was regarding whether p3.
The conciliatory insight has been motivated exclusively at the individ-
ual level–as a rational constraint on individual epistemic subjects. Can we
make sense of the conciliatory insight at the group level? There’s no ob-
vious barrier to doing so on a simple summativist conception of a group,
according to which the attribution to a group of an epistemic state is just
shorthand for an attribution to a majority of individuals an epistemic state.
On the simple summativist proposal, we might firstly define epistemic
peers summatively by saying that Group A andGroup B are epistemic peer
groups just in case enough individuals in group A are peers with enough
individuals in group B. The conciliatory insight, applied to a summativist
conception of group disagreement, reduces to the thought that the indi-
viduals in group A who recognise peer disagreement among individuals in
B should revise their p-beliefs. Notice, though, that construed this way,
the conciliatory insight remains ultimately a rational mandate on individ-
uals.
But as Jennifer Lackey (2014, 1) has remarked, ‘A fairly common view
in current work in collective epistemology is that groups can have knowl-
edge that not a single one of itsmembers possesses’4. Consider, for instance–
and following here Hutchins’ (1995) classic example–of the crew of a ship
navigating its way to port; different crew are responsible for charting dif-
ferent landmarks5. As Lackey puts it:
In such a case, the ship’s behavior as it safely travels into the port is
clearly well-informed and deliberate, leading to the conclusion that
there is collective knowledge present. More precisely, it is said that
the crew as a whole knows, for instance, that they are traveling north
at 12 miles per hour, or that the ship itself knows this, even though
no single crew member does6.
Call the position here group knowledge.
3I take this characterisation from Ballantyne & Coffman (2012).
4Note that Lackey herself does not positively espouse Hutchins’ non-summativist
insight with respect to group knowledge. For some notable proponents of the non-
summativist insight, see here, along with Hutchins (1995), Giere (2002), Knorr-Cetina
(1999), Halverson (1995), Gilbert (2002; 2013), Stoutland (2008), Tuomela (1995) and
Tollefsen (2004). Thanks to an anonymous referee for suggesting clarification here.
5Cf. Minsky’s (1988) remark that ‘each brain contains hundreds of different types of
machines, interconnected in specific ways which predestine that brain to become a large,
diverse society of partially specialized agencies’.
6For a similar kind of case involving an airline cockpit, seeHutchins&Klausen (1996).
See also Winsberg, Huebner, & Kukla, R. (2014) for a case involving collective scientific
collaboration.
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Group knowledge A group, G, can know that p even when not a
single member of G knows that p.
The kind of groups that are candidates for (non-summativist) group
knowledge, in this sense, will not be mere collections of individuals (e.g.
a crowd in New York’s Rockefeller square); rather, the group’s collective
behaviour must be sufficiently integrated (e.g. expert panels, juries), and
demarcated by a common aim7. Furthermore, such groups must generate
cognitive outputs, in the form of representational states8.
It stands to reason that any system that generates cognitive outputs
in the form of representational states can both represent correctly as well
as misrepresent. Thus, the conditions that would make possible group
knowledgemake possible in equalmeasure group fallibility: where a group’s
cognitive output is p, even though not-p is the case. But given that the
groups that can attain group knowledge are fallibile, group knowledge im-
plies what we can call group disagreement:
Group disagreement For two groups, G1 and G2, it is possible
that G1 represents p and G2 not-p.
Just as not all individual epistemic subjects are equally likely to get it
right, the same goes for groups; in Hutchins’ classic case of the ship crew,
we can just as easily imagine a second ship crew of novices, less likely
to navigate the ship to port. But sometimes, groups might be on a kind
of epistemic par prior to a disagreement. Consider an idealised twist on
Hutchins case:
DUELING SHIPS: Call the group constituting the ship crew on
Hutchins’ ship G1. Let G2 be an equally experienced and able crew,
all of whom have received training at the same naval academy as the
crew in G1. (Assume moreover that this is common knowledge).
Suppose G1 and G2 are navigating their respective ships to the port;
let p be a proposition that if G1 continues its course at 15 knots, with
G2 continuing its course at 20 knots, G1 will collide with G2. G1, as
a group, takes p to be false; G2, however, communicates to G1 Gs’s
position that p is true.
Of course, given the significant practical stakes here, it’s plausible that,
purely for purposes of risk-aversion, both ships should (for instance) take
7See here Gilbert’s notion of a plural subject, though see also Gilbert (2013). See also
List (2008, 3), Pettit (2003), and List & Pettit (2005a), (2005b)
8See here List (2008).
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immediate action to slow to a halt and wait for further information9. But
the ‘should’ here is one of practical rationality. Abstracting away from
what the best practical policy is in such a case, it is also appropriate to
ask whether, from a purely epistemic point of view, it is permissible for
G1 and G2 to continue (after the discovered disagreement) to maintain, to
the same extent as before, their ‘cognitive outputs’ of p and not-p, respec-
tively.
It seems plain enough that the considerations that motivate the concil-
iatory insight, at the individual level, motivate a similar stance at the collec-
tive level, when conflicting cognitive outputs are reached (and discovered)
by recognised peer groups10. Thus, two views with notable support in so-
cial epistemology–the conciliatory insight, and the group knowledge thesis,
seem to imply a kind of group conciliatory insight:
(Group) Conciliatory Insight In a revealed group-peer disagree-
ment over p, each group should give at least some weight to the
other (peer) group’s position such that neither group is justi-
fied in staying exactly as confident as before regarding whether
p11.
As it turns out, though, the group conciliatory insight raises a nest of
puzzles. For instance, in the DUELING SHIPS example, the group con-
ciliatory insight mandates that each group revise its belief about whether
p. But how exactly is this supposed to work? More specifically: what must
happpen for this requirement to be met?
2 Group Peerhood Disagreement: Three Problems
It should be emphasised that it would be puzzling at best if those who en-
dorse the group knowledge thesis in collectivist epistemology are some-
how preordained to avow an anti-conciliatory, ‘steadfast’ line in cases like
DUELINGSHIPS, where discovered peer-group disagreement is in place.
But there is at least no problem in making sense of what steadfastness,
for groups, would involve–viz., the status quo. Group conciliatorism, by
9Arguably, such a decision would be in alignment with what is called in health and
environmental decision making, the precautionary princpile–according to which, when
threats to certain damages are great, certain preventative actions (e.g. in this case, slow-
ing the ship) are warranted even if the threat to the damage is not one for which evidence
is conclusive. For an overview, see here Peterson (2007).
10As an anonymous referee has helpfully pointed out, this suggestion presupposes a
kind of epistemic agency for (non-summativist) groups which would would be precluded
by Bryce Huebner’s (2014) recent homoncular functionalist account of group belief.
11I take this characterisation from Ballantyne & Coffman (2012), with slight modifi-
cation.
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contrast, is much more perplexing on this score. Let’s turn now to three
problems that pose prima facie hurdles to vindicating the group concilia-
tion insight.
2.1 The Doxastic Problem
A hallmark of individualist epistemology is the claim that propositional
knowledge entails both truth and belief, (along with further conditions to
the effect that known beliefs must be justified, non-accidentally correct,
etc.). Presumably, then, true cognitive outputs issued by groups, in order
to be knowledge, must be beliefs12. But the move from group knowledge
to group belief is controversial. Hutchins’ crew know that p; but does
Hutchins’ crew believe that p? As Hakli (2007, 251) remarks:
One reason for this may be that the word ‘knowledge’ seems less tied
to being a mental state [than belief]. In everyday language use, it is
sometimes said that there is knowledge in books or libraries, for ex-
ample, even though there is no agent that has the knowledge...Consequently,
it might be easier to literally attribute knowledge to groups than to
literally attribute beliefs to groups.
The debate between rejectionists (e.g. Meijers (1999); Wray (2001);
Hakli (2007)) and what have been dubbed believers: (Gilbert 2002; Tollef-
sen 2003) centres around the issue of whether groups can have bona fide
beliefs, or merely acceptances13. A problem for the group conciliatory in-
sight materialises: if rejectionists are right, then regardless of whether the
group knowledge thesis is correct, beliefs cannot be properly attributed
to groups (in the non-summativist sense)14. Obviously, groups can revise
beliefs only provided that groups have beliefs to revise. Groups can’t be
rationally required to revise what they don’t have15. Therefore, it looks
like if rejectionists are right, the group conciliatory insight cannot be vin-
dicated. Call this the doxastic problem.
2.2 The Discharge Problem
Suppose, for the sake of argument, that the doxastic problem can be met and
that groups can have beliefs no less than knowledge. A general normative
12See, however, Myers-Schulz & Schwitzgebel (2013) for a recent challenge to main-
stream thinking on this point.
13For a helpful overview of some of the characteristic distinctions, see Engel (1998).
14See Hakli (2007) for a rejectionist line on group knowledge to the effect that: group
knowledge is justified, true acceptance. For an overview, see Mathiesen (2007).
15For a discussion of the platitude that ought implies can, extended to groups and group
abilities, see Lawford-Smith (2013, 453).
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problem arises, one that will crop up for any particular account of group
belief16; the problem, in short, is how to make sense of a group obligation
to undertake doxastic revision? More specifically, how can we make sense
of how this rational obligation might be discharged from a group G to
members? It’s not obvious after all what the members of G are meant
to do in order that G does not count as (and in violation of the group
conciliatory insight) staying exactly as confident as before in its original
cognitive output.
To bring this problem into sharp relief, it is helpful to consider a plau-
sible constraint on any group action, which Lackey (2014, 7) calls the,
Group/Member Action Principle:
Group/Member Action Principle (GMAP) For every group, G,
and act, , G performs  only if at least one member of G
performs some act or other that causally contributes to .17
What GMAP preserves, Lackey says, ‘is that while group action cannot
occur independently of its members, it can go beyond what any of them do
individually18’ (Ibid., 7).
What GMAP implies, thus, is that, in our DUELING SHIPS case, G1
can revise its belief that p only if at least one member of G1 performs some
act that causally contributes to the group’s collectively revising its belief.
But what would such an act be? Of course, such a requirement borders on
incoherence were we to suppose that G1 believes p, and G2 not-p, but that
no individual in G1 is aware that G2, as a group, believes not-p19. What
16In §3 I take up a problem that arises more directly for the nature of group belief in
terms of undertaking certain commitments (e.g. Gilbert (2002; 2013)).
17For a similar statement, see Pekka Makela and Raimo Tuomela (2002, 198): ‘If a
group (with the agents A1,...,An as its members) does something X then at least some of
its members, say A1,...,An (mn) must, in the right circumstances, do something X1,...,Xn,
as their parts of a joint action X (or of a joint action generating X)’.
18My italics.
19Tobe clear, I am not suggesting that it is incoherent that groupmembers not be aware
when group disagreements are in place. It is after all not incoherent that an individual
be a member of a group that believes p, even though the individual is not aware that
the group believes p (e.g. see Huebner (2014)). Rather, the point is the following: If
GMAP is correct, then G1 can revise its belief that p only if at least one member of G1
performs some act that causally contributes to the group’s collectively revising its belief.
Now, what I suggest is borderlines on incoherence is that this rational requirement be
in place for G1 even in a situation where no individual in G1 is at least aware of the
group belief disagreement. This is, in effect, a point in line with ‘ought implies can’.
The same suggestion holds at the individual level, in that, the epistemological question
of what is rationally required in the face of peer disagreement is always a question about
revealed or recognised peer disagreements. Thanks to an anonymous referee for requesting
clarification on this point.
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this reveals is that a precondition for the kind of recognised group peer dis-
agreement that–by reference to the conciliatory insight–would motivate
doxastic revision, is the following: that the relevant peer disagreement be
recognised by at least one individual in the group20.
Suppose this condition is satisfied. Even so, with reference to GMAP,
a kind of discharge problem raises its head: what can any individual be ob-
ligated to do to causally contribute to the group?s revising its belief? Sup-
pose Stan is a member of Hutchins’ crew, and Stan is aware both that his
crew–G1–collectively believe p, and further, that G2 (a recognised peer
group) believes not-p. What, with reference to the group conciliatory in-
sight, is Stan’s obligation? We might be tempted to say that his obligation
is to act so as to revise G2’s collective belief that p. The background ratio-
nale might be that: ought distributes over conjunction in such a way that:
if G2 has an obligation to , then so does each of its members.
A moment’s reflection shows that Stan’s obligation can’t be accounted
for in this way. Just suppose, to borrow a simple example from Lawford-
Smith (2013), that A, B, C and D are four equal-partner employees of a
moving company–ABCDMoving–and that, while they are working a job,
they accidentally drop a piano so that a child is trapped. ABCD Moving
has an obligation to remove the piano. But if the ought binding the group
distributes over the conjunction of its members such that A thereby has an
obligation to remove the piano, then a simple problem quickly emerges21:
just suppose that A cannot lift the piano alone, and B, C, and D do not
help. A cannot then be obligated to move the piano22.
What this means, though, is that if Stan’s obligation–as circumscribed
by the group conciliatory insight–is to revise G1’s belief that p, it can’t be
simply because (as the group conciliatory insight insists) G1 has this obli-
gation.
This point, to be clear, does not entail either that the group concil-
iatory insight is false nor that ought doesn’t distribute over conjunction.
(After all, ought might distribute over conjunction in ways other than the
simple way just considered). Rather, and put carefully, the point is that
whatever it is that Stan is (by reference to the group conciliatory insight)
rationally obligated to do, it isn’t something that can be explained so simply
as to say that Stan is obligated to revise G1’s collective belief that p. Some
further sophistication is thus needed to account for how rational obliga-
20Thus, there is no meaningful sense in which the recognition requirement undergird-
ing the rational requirement of belief revision will be satisfied in a situation where the
individuals of a group are not aware what the group’s cognitive output is. See here, for
instance, Huebner (2014).
21Cf. Jackson & Pargetter (1986).
22See Lawford-Smith (2013, 456). For an earlier presentation of this case, see Tuomela
& Miller (1988).
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tion for G1 to revise its belief that p might be discharged to its members.
Call this the discharge problem.
2.3 The Problem of Normative Conflict
Let’s suppose that the discharge problem is addressed, such that Stan has
some obligation O, and that he has O in virtue of G1’s obligation to revise
its belief that p. By GMAP, Stan’s performing O must causally contribute
to G1 revising its belief. We might initially suppose that O is the obli-
gation to inform the other crew members that G2 belives not-p. But this
obligation is too weakly construed. To see why, simply imagine a modified
case where each member of G1 is like Stan in so far as each member in G1
learns that G2 believes not-p. If Stan’s obligation, qua member of G1, is
merely to inform the others that G2 believes not-p, then consider that the
other members of G1, M1...Mn, will also have discharged their respective
obligations simply by telling other G1 members that G2 believes not-p. But
it obviously doesn’t follow from all members M1...Mn in G1 being aware
that G2 believes not-p that G1 has–through M1...Mn’s awareness–satisfied
its conciliatory obligation to no longer maintain its belief to the same ex-
tent. It would remain an open question whether, after such awareness, G1
then actually counts as revising its belief that p23.
Thus, whatever obligation individuals in G1 have in virtue of G1 as
a group being rationally required to revise its p-belief, the obligation is
stronger than merely reporting to others in the group that G2’s belief is in
conflict with G1’s belief. In order to (as per GMAP) causally contribute to
G1’s revising its belief, then, Stanmust perform some action that is a part of
a causal chain that results not just in the members of G1 appreciating that
G1’s group belief conflicts with G2’s group belief–but rather, Stan must
perform some action that is part of a causal chain that results in G1 no
longer holding p to the same extent as before.
Plausibly, such an action will at least involve the following: encourag-
ing the other members of the crew to act in ways that will jointly cause G1
to revise, groupally, its previous doxastic position vis-a-vis p, even if just
by degree24.
But here a problem of normative conflict emerges. The obligation just
outlined–to act in ways that will cause members of G1 to jointly act so as to
revise G1’s previous doxastic position vis-a-vis p, seems to directly conflict
23Compare: in the individual case, one issue is whether peer disagreement is revealed.
Another is whether each party to the revealed peer disagreement revises her belief in the
face of the revelation. The revelation is not itself a kind of revision.
24See Elga (2007) here for a proposal according to which the rational stance to take is
to split the difference. Feldman (2007) by contrast recommends agnosticism with respect
to p.
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with an independent obligation that each member of G1 has in virtue of
being a member of a group that collectively believes p.
To appreciate this point, consider here Gilbert’s (1999; 2002) classic
‘plural subject’ account of group belief25, according to which a group belief
is formed when the members jointly accept a view26. Joint acceptance is
then understood as a kind of conditional commitment: when groupmembers
conditionally commit to accept that p, each is committed to accepting that
p provided the others do27.
So, what is one committing to when committing to accept that p pro-
vided others do? Gilbert says:
One who participates in joint acceptance of p thereby accepts an
obligation to do what he can to bring it about that any joint en-
deavors...among the members of G be conducted on the assumption
that p is true. He is entitled to expect others’ support in bringing
this about...if one does believe something that is inconsistent with p, one
is required at least not to express that belief baldly.28 (Gilbert 1989, pp.
306-7)
In short, a group believes that p only if its members act as if p; and in
being a part of a group that believes that p, one is obligated to act as if p,
and the obligation to act as if p includes an obligation to suppress one’s
doubts vis-a-vis p29.
This suppression requirement of course looks to be in stark tension
with the thought that the group conciliatory insight could ever be satis-
fied30; after all, how can (for instance) Stan (alaGMAP) causally contribute
25Note that Gilbert has moved toward an exclusively ‘joint commitment approach’,
and no longer relies on the language of ‘plural subject’. Thanks to an anonymous referee
for raising this point.
26Note that the problem of normative conflict sketched in this section is specific to
joint commitment accounts of group belief. Accounts of group belief that do not rely
on a joint commitment condition (as Gilbert does) do not face this particular problem.
Thanks to an anonymous referee for suggesting clarification here.
27See Gilbert (1996, 204-05; cf. Gilbert (2013)); see also here for a helpful overview
Mathiesen (2006, 168). Note that joint commitments are fundamentally group, not in-
dividual, commitments.
28My italics. Much of this passage is quoted also in Lackey (2012).
29Cf. Mathiesen 2006 for resistence on this point, by appealing to group epistemic
obligations. I am sympathetic toMathiesen’s argument and will be challenging the simple
suppression interpretation of Gilbert’s requirement in §3.
30At this point, the following point could be raised: why not simply abandon the sup-
pression requirement? After all, as this line of thought goes, the tension in question
evaporates if we can simply reject out of hand Gilbert’s suppression requirement. This
move, however, cannot be pursued so easily. Something very much like the suppression
requirement is going to naturally fall out of any construal of non-summativist group be-
lief as conditional commitment; without individuals in a group committed to acting as
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to bringing the members of G1 to revise their belief that p if Stan is obli-
gated, qua part of a group that believes that p, to suppress his doubts about
p?
One might try to find a way out of this jam by exploiting a loophole
Gilbert (2004, 104) offers–whereby one is allowed to express one’s doubts
about the veracity of the group belief in a ‘personal’ capacity, provided this
expression is not as a member of the group31. But, it’s hard to see exactly
what kinds of expressions of doubts (with reference to this loophole) will
remain permissible. Mathiesen (2006, 169) nicely captures the worry:
Does it mean that the member must make clear that she recognizes
that what she is about to say is not the official group view, but never-
theless she intends to question that view and intends that the others
engage with her on this topic as group members? Or does it mean
that the member must make clear that she is merely expressing a
‘personal belief’, which neither she nor the other members of the
group should see as part of the group belief forming and revising
process?
One thing should be clear: any attempt for Stan to discharge his obli-
gation (via the group conciliatory insight) by acting to causally contribute
to G1’s revising its collective belief that p, can’t (with reference to Stan’s
commitment and corresponding obligation to accepting that p) be via the
expression of doubts as a member of the group, but only as personal doubts
(whatever this would mean).
But now an even deeper conflict appears: it seems that it is specifically
in virtue of Stan’s membership in a group that believes p that (by the group
conciliatory insight) he is obligated to act to cause the group to jointly
revise its belief that p. But this obligation is an obligation Stan has because
if p, it’s not clear how the group can be said to believe that p. I do not think the prob-
lem turns out to be intractable, as will be suggested in the positive proposal I sketch in
the §3.2. Nonetheless, that something like suppression seems to fall out of the kind of
conditional acceptance to act as if p is true that is an element of group belief, it suffices
for the present purposes to see that avoiding the tension is not so easy as simply drop-
ping the suppression requirement. Thanks to Jennifer Lackey for helpful suggestions for
clarification on this point.
31I should admit, however, that I do not here have a principled explanation of what fea-
tures of acting as if p are relevant to not undermining joint commitment. In particular,
the philosophical problem is: what features of of acting as if p are relevant to undermining
joint commitment, and why? In Hutchins’ case, for instance, it seems clear enough that
blowing a signalling horn that all crew recognise would be blown only if p is false, is an
instance of not acting as if p, in a way that would be relevant to undermining joint com-
mitment. But cases of, for instance, flipping a switch, become more complicated. I do
not at present have worked out principled conditions here, though I think any such prin-
cipled account would need to be informed by context-relevant details of cases. Thanks
to an anonymous referee for raising this issue.
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he is member of the group–and so his expressions of doubt and actions that
would causally contribute to G1’s joint revision of its belief that p cannot
be merely personal. They are, by the group conciliatory insight, precisely
his obligations as a member of the group.
3 Group Peer Disagreement and the Conciliatory Insight
Revisited
3.1 An Awkward Result
The doxastic problem, the discharge problem and the problem of normative con-
flict, taken together, spell trouble for the prospects of extending the concil-
iatory insight from individual peer disagreements to group peer disagree-
ments.
Does this mean that the group conciliatory insight should be rejected?
It does seem that way. But what is the alternative? As Tom Kelly (2011)
points out, there are actually a spectrum of positions that can be endorsed
by one who rejects the conciliatory position32. One alternative incompat-
ible with the group conciliatory insight is what we can callModerate Group
Steadfastness, a position that denies the conciliatory claim that the fact of
revealed peer disagreement always rationally requires some level of belief
revision.
Moderate (Group) Steadfastness In at least some cases of revealed
group peer disagreement over p, it can be reasonable to stick to
one’s guns; in other cases, some non-negligible belief revision
is required.
The ‘non-negligible’ belief revision that is rationally required by mod-
erate steadfastness views can be considerably less demanding than, for in-
stance, Adam Elga’s (2007) equal weight position. But moderate steadfast
views will insist that in some cases of revealed peer disagreement, at least
some weight must be given to the peer’s position.
Awkwardly, it looks like the three problems outlined in §2 will raise
problems not only for the group conciliatory insight, but also, formoderate
group steadfastness, in so far as the moderate position allows that there are at
least some instances in which group peer disagreement will rationally re-
quire some (non-negligible) group doxastic revision. But this means that if
we reject the group conciliatory insight on the basis of the reasons outlined
in §2, then what we are left with is not a moderate group steadfastness, but
rather, with a stronger position which we can call strong group steadfastness.
32See here Kelly (2011, §1)
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Strong (Group) Steadfastness In all cases of revealed group peer
disagreement over p, it is reasonable to stick to one’s guns–
such that it is not unreasonable for both parties to remain as
confident as they initially were regarding whether p
Not even the most ardent critics of the conciliatory view, at the indi-
vidual level, want to take on board the strong steadfast view that insists it
is always rationally permissible for both parties to hold their guns in all
circumstances of revealed group peer disagreement.
Strong Group Steadfastness is thus an unwelcome consequence. But
we either attempt to find some way to make sense of the requirement that
groups rationally revise their beliefs in the face of group peer disagreement
(despite the worries raised in S2) or accept the implausibly strong group
steadfastness position. The former approach looks more promising.
3.2 Action, Risk and Representation
While it’s evident that the doxastic problem, the discharge problem and the
problem of normative conflict will significantly constrict how it is that we
might compellingly spell out how the group conciliatory insight could be
respected, in practice, it’s no less evident that the strong group steadfast-
ness alternative simply won’t work in theory. In this section, I want to
sketch what I think is a potential way out of this impasse–a limited de-
fence of a way to hold on to group conciliationism in light of the problems
advanced.
To this end, consider first the doxastic problem. The doxastic problem
in short says that groups don’t have the sort of thing that can be revised–
beliefs; rejectionists offer a number of reasons for thinking that groups
have acceptances rather than beliefs33; thus, it looks like the group con-
ciliationism can be vindicated only if one is prepared to enter the debate
between rejectionists and believers vis-a-vis group belief and demonstrate
that rejectionists are wrong and believers are right.
But I think there is a sensible way to defend group conciliationism
without this dialectical burden. The doxastic problem is a problem, af-
ter all, for group conciliationism only if we accept ex ante a certain picture
about what doxastic revision would involve. This picture says that beliefs
can be revised (perhaps, by lowering credences) and acceptances cannot.
However, there’s room to resist things at this point. Consider here
Preyer’s (2003) statement of an idea that undergirds the rejectionist think-
ing about the difference between belief and acceptance, as this bears on
the matter of revision:
33See here Meijers (1999; 2002), Mathiesen (2006) and Preyer (2003).
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Beliefs are gradual (quantitative) and have subjective probabilities,
acceptance is a matter of quality...They have a feature of all or noth-
ing.
With this idea in play, Meijers (2002)–a leading proponent of the rejec-
tionist position–reasons in the following way. Gilbert-style group beliefs
involve conditional agreements, where such agreements are essentially an
on-off matter. As Meijers puts it, ‘We agree, or we do not’, (Ibid., 81).
Thus, we should reject that groups have beliefs, because beliefs don’t have
such an all-or-nothing feature; rather, they are gradient.
There is some space though for the proponent of group conciliatorism
to intercede here. Whilst agreement is indeed an on-or-off affair, there is
a matter of flexibility with respect to the object of agreement, when that
object is a representational attitude. Wemight agree as a group to endorse
a p without qualification, or with certain qualifications, regarding just how
we shall act as if p.
The ways we are obligated to act, as a result of this agreement, will
be in part a function of any such qualification made. At one limit, where
there is no qualification, we might agree to act (as Gilbert’s view suggests)
as if p (as a member of the group) in our talk and actions, no matter what
doubts we harbour, no matter the circumstance.
Though we might agree to jointly accept p, with certain qualifications,
and again, how we’re obligated to act will be in part a function of such
qualifications. We might for instance agree to accept p as a group and, in
doing so, agree to rely on p in ways that track the practical stakes.
At this point, it will be useful to make a comparison to the case of an
individual believer and a propositional attitude, . There is a range of
propositional attitudes 1:::n that I might have, vis-a-vis some proposi-
tion p, which correspond to my willingness to act as if p, given certain
stakes34.
At one end of the spectrum of propositional attitudes, for instance, we
might envision the attitude of ’being certain that’, where it is reasonable
forme to act onmy attitude of being certain that p nomatter what the practi-
cal risk of being wrong. But we can also imagine attitudes toward the other
end of the spectrum, which are reasonable to rely on only in circumstances
where there is very little risk to being wrong, but not when such risks are
great. For example, the attitude of suspecting that or conjecturing that p fits
this profile.
Now, regardless of whether I am certain that p or merely suspect that
p, in both cases I accept that p in so far as I am willing to rely on p across
34For a much more detailed expression of this kind of idea, see Carter, J.A., Jarvis, B.
& Rubin, K. (2014).
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certain counterfactual circumstances. What differs dramatically is the cir-
cumstances.
Returning now to the group case; rather than to delimit the group’s
range of propositional attitudes vis-a-vis p to believing that p or accepting
that p, we can (as in the individual case) envision a range of propositional
attitudes 1:::n a group might have, vis-a-vis some proposition p, which
correspond to the group’s willingness to rely on p, given certain stakes.
The agreement a group makes, in agreeing to accept p as a group,
might thus be an agreement to rely on p more or less, depending on the
circumstances. If for instance the group’s epistemic position vis-a-vis p is
weak, the group might be reasonable to agree as a group to accept p, in
the following qualified way: the group agrees to rely on p only when there
is little risk to being wrong. In such a situation, (and analogously with
the case of an individual agent) we might say the group merely suspects or
conjectures that p. Alternatively, a group might jointly agree (in light of
a strong epistemic position) to accept p in a very different way: to rely on
p even if there is great risk to being wrong. In such a situation, we might
say the group is certain that p.
In this respect, we can see that–without engaging directly with the re-
jectionists about group belief–there is scope to argue that a group’s tak-
ing up a representation attitude by agreement isn’t (simply qua a product of
agreement, per se) incompatible with a group adopting a gradient hierarchy
of attitudes.
With this picture inmind, we have the resources to address the doxastic
problem; a possibility for modelling group belief revision emerges, and
which is compatible with the Gilbert-style thought that group belief is a
matter of agreement. Just consider that a group can agree to accept p by
agreeing to act as if p in the following qualified way: the group can agree
to act as if p across a range of circumstances that positively correlates with the
group’s epistemic position, which is a position the individuals of the group
agree to (and are thus obligated to) update.35
A group that has agreed to accept p, and thus agreed to act as if p in the
fashion just described, might accordingly (in the face of revealed group
peer disagreement) downgrade its position from being almost sure that p
to merely suspecting p in the following way: the group will have agreed
that when evidence comes in against p, the group will move from acting as
if p across most all practical environments, to acting as if p only in a narrow
set of circumstances, where there is little practical risk of being wrong.
35Note that the norms governing acceptance here are fundamentally epistemic, in that
what fixes the circumstances under which one which acts as if p, that correspond with
different doxastic attitudes, is strength of epistemic position. On the difference between
epistemic versus practical norms of acceptance, see Proust (2012).
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It should be clear how the model suggested here not only offers a way
around the doxastic problem, but also, that it offers a simple solution to
the problem of normative conflict. The problem of normative conflict
emerged when it seemed that whatever one might do to cause the group
to revise its belief would be strictly incompatible with a group member’s
obligations qua a member of a group that has agreed to act as if p is true.
However, on the proposal offered here, speaking out when new evidence
comes against the proposition accepted by the group is precisely what one
agrees to do when agreeing to act as if p is true across a range of circum-
stances that positively correlates with the group’s current (and updated)
epistemic position, vis-a-vis p36. Thus, there is no conflict.
This leaves of course the discharge problem. I will not attempt here
to answer the more general philosophical problem of what the conditions
are for any member to incur an obligation as a part of a group. It should
suffice at this point to point out that the proposal I’ve offered renders it
much less mysterious what (by GMAP) one could do to cause the group to
revise its collective doxastic stance towards p. The individual is obligated
(as she acquires new evidence) to herself act as if p is true in a range of
circumstances that aligns with the updated evidence, and to encourage
others to act this way. For instance, when Stan learns that G2 believes that
not-p, Stan’s obligation is to (for his part) limit the range of circumstances
in which he will act as if p is true to those scenarios where the cost of
being wrong is lower. He is obligated to encourage others to do the same.
Since in the case of DUELING SHIPS, the practical cost is high, Stan is
obligated to refrain from proceeding as if p is true, and to encourage others
accordingly; in doing so, he will have (in alignment with GMAP) causally
contributed to G1’s downgrading its belief that p to a mere conjecture that
p, one the group acts on only across a more narrow range of circumstances
than before. Plausibly, this is precisely what Hutchins’ ship ought to do in
the face of group peer disagreement. Despite the initial hurdles, then, it
looks like collectivist epistemology does in the end have the resources to
embrace a kind of group conciliatory insight that parallels the widely held
conciliatory insight in individualist epistemology. Given the appeal of this
insight in individualist epistemology, this is good news37.
36Note that the problem of normative conflict arise because the commitment each
member of the group has, qua member of the group that believes p, is to act as if p. On
such a construal, it seemed there was no room for a member of such a group to do any
action that causally contributes to group belief revision, as such an action would appear
to violate one’s commitment to act as if p. However, the proposal I’ve sketched here has
attempted to circumvent this tension by going beyond what Gilbert says in specifying
how one counts as acting as if p (as would be established by the commitment).
37I would like to thank an audience at Institute Jean Nicod, where this paper was pre-
sented in March 2014, for helpful feedback. Special thanks also to Emma C. Gordon,
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